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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
The Organization of Disappearing Island Nations (ODIN), Apa 
Mana, and Noah Flood (together, “Appellants”) appeal from an 
Opinion and Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint, entered 
August 15, 2018, by the honorable Judge Remus in the U.S. 
District Court for New Union Island, No. 66-CV-2018. The district 
court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(2018), given the Complaint raises questions arising under federal 
law and the Constitution. Appellants filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4 (2016). The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has valid jurisdiction over the 
appeal based on 29 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018). 
 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
 
I.  Can Apa Mana bring an Alien Tort Statute (ATS or the “Statute”), 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018), claim against HexonGlobal, a domestic 
corporation? 
 
II. Is the Trail Smelter Principle a recognized principle of customary 
international law enforceable as the “Law of Nations” under the 
ATS? 
 
III. Assuming the Trail Smelter Principle is customary international 
law, does it impose obligations enforceable against non-
governmental actors? 
 
IV. If otherwise enforceable, is the Trail Smelter Principle displaced 
by the Clean Air Act? 
 
V. Is there a cause of action against the United States Government, 
based on the Fifth Amendment substantive due process protections 
for life, liberty, and property, for failure to protect the global 
atmospheric climate system due to the production, sale, and 
burning of fossil fuels? 
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VI. Do Plaintiffs’ law of nations claim under the Alien Tort Statute 
and public trust claim under the Fifth Amendment present non-
justiciable political questions?  
 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
I. Factual Background 
Over the past several decades, the interrelatedness between 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the changing climate system 
has become evident. It is now nearly an uncontested fact among 
the scientific community: “Evidence tells an unambiguous story: 
the planet is warming, and over the last half century, this warming 
has been driven primarily by human activity.” Jerry M. Melillo et 
al., 2014: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE U.S.: THE THIRD 
NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH 
PROGRAM 7 (May 2014) [hereinafter U.S.: THE THIRD NAT’L 
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT]. Anthropogenic climate change presents 
unmatched challenges for the global community, including 
extreme weather events like droughts, flooding, and wildfires. U.N. 
Env’t Programme and World Meteorological Org., 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], IPCC 
Synthesis Report, Climate Change 2014 (Summary for 
Policymakers), at 8 [hereinafter IPCC Synthesis Report]. Avoiding 
the catastrophic impacts of climate change requires sweeping and 
concerted action from local, state, national, and international 
governments to reduce GHG emissions. 
HexonGlobal Corporation (HexonGlobal) is the surviving 
corporation of the merger of all major U.S. oil producers. Record 
(R.) at 5. HexonGlobal, through sales of its extracted fossil fuels, 
has contributed substantially to global GHG emissions. Id. The 
normal combustion of petroleum (a HexonGlobal fossil fuel) results 
in the emission of considerable amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2). 
Id. Information establishing the heat-retention properties of CO2 
has been available since the nineteenth century. HexonGlobal does 
not dispute that since the 1970s the corporation has been aware 
that continued combustion of fossil fuels would result in harmful 
global climate change, including sea level rise. Id. Nevertheless, 
HexonGlobal continued to extract fossil fuels, which led to 
injurious GHG emissions. Id. 
3
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The United States is in a unique position. As the world’s 
largest historical contributor of GHGs—responsible for twenty 
percent of global cumulative emissions—the country plays a 
critical role in the implementation of mitigation strategies. R. at 
5–6. Despite the extensive research the federal government has 
conducted indicating that the consequences of inaction are dire, the 
U.S. has neglected its responsibility. In fact, for over a century, the 
U.S. has promoted fossil fuel production through federal policies 
including hundreds of billions in tax subsidies. R. at 6. Recently, 
the U.S. has taken steps towards reducing its GHG emissions, and 
has acknowledged the potential dangers of climate change. Id.; see 
also U.S.: THE THIRD NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, at 7. While U.S. 
efforts seemed promising and emissions began to decrease, efforts 
were abandoned, and emissions lacked adequate control. R. at 7. 
Under the Trump Administration, the U.S. is reversing its 
commitments to safeguard the climate system. Id. 
Appellant Apa Mana is an alien national of the island nation 
of A’Na Atu. Appellant Noah Flood is a U.S. citizen and resident of 
the New Union Islands, a U.S. possession. R. at 3. Both appellants 
are members of the ODIN, a non-profit membership organization 
devoted to protecting the interests of island nations threatened by 
climate change. Id. Both A’Na Atu and New Union Islands are low-
lying islands, with the populated areas of both islands lying below 
one meter in elevation. R. at 4. A one-half to one-meter rise in sea 
level from climate change would render the islands uninhabitable. 
Id. Appellants bring the present claims to prevent this future harm 
and seek damages for injuries already suffered. Mana asserts a 
claim against HexonGlobal for violation of the law of nations under 
the ATS, because appellee’s fossil fuel related emissions 
significantly contribute to climate change and have caused 
substantial damage to Mana’s community from the rising sea level. 
R. at 3. Appellant Flood asserts a claim against the United States, 
based on the government’s failure to protect the global climate 
system held in public trust, and therefore subjecting Flood to loss 
of life, liberty, and property in violation of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. Id. It is undisputed that limits on fossil 
fuel production and combustion would reduce further damage to 
Appellants’ properties from sea level rise, decrease health risks 
associated with rising temperatures, and maintain the habitability 
of the islands. R. at 5. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/3
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2018, Appellants filed a complaint against HexonGlobal 
and the United States of America in the U.S. District Court for 
New Union Island. R. at 1. The Complaint asserted claims against 
HexonGlobal under the Alien Tort Statute, and constitutional 
claims against the United States for violations of public trust 
obligations to protect the global climate system incorporated 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution. R. at 1. On August 15, 2018, Judge Remus issued an 
Opinion and Order dismissing Appellants’ Complaint. R. at. 11. 
Appellants filed a timely Notice of Appeal, granted by this Court. 
R. at 1. 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Appellant Apa Mana is entitled to bring a claim against 
HexonGlobal, a domestic corporation, under the Alien Tort 
Statute. The District Court for New Union Island incorrectly 
concluded the Statute precludes corporate liability. R. at 8. 
Traditional principles of statutory interpretation demand a finding 
that permits domestic corporate liability. The plain language of the 
ATS is unambiguous and the legislative history supports the 
Statute’s clear language, which is at odds with corporate 
immunity. Allowing corporations, such as HexonGlobal, to act 
without consequences is illogical and antithetical to the Statute’s 
purpose. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent holding in 
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, excluded foreign corporate liability 
because the Court expressed its concern of meddling in foreign 
policy. 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018). That same concern is 
inapplicable to Appellant’s claim invoking liability against 
HexonGlobal. 
The Trail Smelter Principle (the “Principle”) is a principle of 
customary international law, which is enforceable as the law of 
nations under the ATS. What constitutes a tort in violation of the 
law of nations under the Statute remains unsettled, but it is 
generally accepted that any claim based on customary 
international law must be specific, universal, and obligatory, so as 
to govern the behavior among States. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692, 714 (2004). The Principle imposes on every State an 
obligation to refrain from acts in its sovereign territory that are 
5
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contrary to the rights of other States or that would cause 
transboundary harm. R. at 8; Trail Smelter Arbitration, (U.S. v. 
Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963 (1941). This Principle has been 
specifically reiterated by international sources and practiced by 
nations across the world to such an extent establishing it as 
customary international law enforceable as the law of nations. 
Non-governmental actors—including HexonGlobal—are 
obligated to comply with the Trail Smelter Principle. The Principle, 
which is embodied in a U.S. treaty, carries with it the same force 
as federal law. R. at 6; see United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 
169. Thus, the same obligations are imposed on actors violating the 
law. Further, while international law is typically carried on at a 
higher level, administered by States and stipulated by their 
representatives, the law of nations can nevertheless be enforced 
against private, non-governmental actors. Specifically, when the 
law of nations is violated under the ATS, the adjudicating court is 
still able to impose liability on non-governmental actors in the 
same way they do for other claims. While the tort committed under 
the ATS is one in violation of the law of nations, the claim is before 
a federal court and the available remedies are those originating in 
federal law. International law also recognizes the individual 
liability of non- governmental actors. The most authoritative 
sources of international law specifically impose duties and 
liabilities upon individuals as well as States. The Nurnberg Trial 
1946, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (Int’l Mil. Trib. at Nuremberg 1946). 
The Trail Smelter Principle is not displaced by the Clean Air 
Act (CAA or the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2018), because the two 
are not in conflict. However, even if the Principle and the CAA do 
conflict, the Principle is embodied in the Preamble of a ratified U.S. 
treaty. UNFCCC, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 169; R. at 6. Under the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, ratified treaties and 
federal law both operate as the supreme law of the land. U.S. 
CONST. art. VI. Federal law may displace a treaty, and vice-versa, 
depending on whichever is enacted most recent in time. Thus, the 
Trail Smelter Principle, as embodied in a U.S. treaty, displaces the 
CAA, which was enacted prior to ratification of the treaty. 
The U.S. Government violated the Public Trust Doctrine by 
failing to protect the global atmospheric climate system from 
disruption. As a result, the government deprived appellant Flood 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/3
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of substantive due process protections of life, liberty, and property, 
which he is entitled under the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. Pursuant to the Public Trust Doctrine, as custodian to 
its citizens, the U.S. serves as fiduciary and must protect the public 
trust within its sovereign boundaries. The United States has had 
knowledge of the dire consequences of increased GHG emissions on 
climate change. R. at 6. Despite this knowledge, the U.S. not only 
failed to adequately regulate emissions, but also supported the 
fossil fuel industry through federal policies and tax subsidies. R. at 
6. As a result, the U.S. breached its fiduciary duty, which directly 
contributed to climate destabilization. Appellant Flood has already 
experienced property damage, limited access to food, and increased 
health risks, R. at 5, in violation of his substantive due process 
rights. 
Appellants’ claims before this court do not present 
nonjusticiable political questions. The federal courts are expressly 
authorized to hear cases arising under the Constitution, or those 
that involve the U.S. or a foreign citizen as party. U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 2. Congress has also explicitly granted jurisdiction to hear 
claims brought by aliens under the ATS. Neither issue before this 
court has been constitutionally committed to another branch, 
therefore, it is proper for this court to rule on both matters. Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). It is the responsibility of the 
Judiciary to interpret ambiguous laws and to resolve claims arising 
under the Constitution. Id. at 211. Fulfilling this duty will not 
require this court to adhere to any previously made political 
declaration, nor will it result in multiple pronouncements made in 
violation of the separation of powers. Resolution of these questions 
only requires this court to apply normal principles of interpretation 
to the contested provisions of law. 
Appellants respectfully request that the Twelfth Circuit Court 
of Appeals reverse the district court’s decision and remand for 
further proceedings. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The U.S. District Court for New Union Island erred as a 
matter of law when it dismissed Appellants’ Complaint. Thus, this 
court should review the decision de novo. See Howard v. Office of 
the Chief Admin. Officer of the U.S. House of Representatives, 720 
7
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F.3d 939, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Because this case comes to us on 
an appeal from a motion to dismiss, we review the District Court 
decision de novo.”). The district court’s legal determinations are 
entitled to little or no deference. Id. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE ENABLES “ALIEN”1
 
VICTIMS TO BRING SUITS AGAINST DOMESTIC 
CORPORATE PERSONS. 
A. Traditional Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
Preclude a Categorical Exemption for Domestic 
Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute. 
In place for nearly 230 years, the Alien Tort Statute grants 
U.S. courts the jurisdiction to hear cases and award damages to 
aliens who are victims of violations of customary international law. 
28 U.S.C. § 1350.2
 
The District Court for New Union Island 
incorrectly held that the ATS forecloses claims against domestic 
corporations. R. at 11. The Statute contains no exclusionary 
language such that allowing claims against corporations would 
contravene the plain meaning. The relevant history surrounding 
the ATS’s enactment reinforces the notion that liability is 
permitted. 
1. The Plain Language of the ATS is Unambiguous and 
Contains No Exclusionary Provision Limiting Who 
May be Held Accountable to Alien Victims for 
Violations of the Law of Nations. 
Under traditional canons of statutory interpretation, analysis 
begins first and foremost with the plain language of the statute. If 
the language is unambiguous, judicial inquiry ceases. Rubin v. 
 
1 As used herein, alien refers to “[a]ny person not a citizen or national of the 
United States.” Definition of Terms, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/data-standards-and-
definitions/definition-terms (last visited Sept. 1, 2018). 
2 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  
 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/3
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United States, 449 U.S. 424, 420 (1981); see Hartford Underwriters 
Ins. Co v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (“When ‘the 
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts’—at least 
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—’is to 
enforce it according to its terms.’”). In Hartford Underwriters Ins. 
Co v. Union Planters Bank, the Supreme Court was tasked with 
evaluating whether a provision of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code3
 
allowed administrative claimants. Id. at 14. In concluding 
the language excluded certain claimants, the Court considered 
several factors. Id. at 6. First, when the statute “‘names the parties 
granted the right to invoke its provision, such parties only may 
act.’” Id. at 7 (quoting 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (5th ed. 1992)). Second, the Court 
considered whether the exclusionary language of the party granted 
the right “is the most obvious party who would have been thought 
empowered to use the provision.” Id. 
Applying the logic of Hartford to the present case, it would be 
improper to conclude that the ATS permits non-aliens to bring 
claims when the language clearly names the party entitled the 
right to invoke its provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Another clear 
example is the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), oft-cited 
alongside the ATS. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). The TVPA states: “An 
individual who . . . subjects an individual to torture shall . . . be 
liable for damages to that individual.” Id. (emphasis added). The 
TVPA expressly prescribes who may be a claimant and who may 
be held liable: individuals. Id. Consequently, the language of the 
TVPA excludes corporate claimants and corporate liability. Id. 
Unlike the statute in Hartford and the TVPA, the ATS contains no 
exclusionary language preventing liability for certain parties. 
2. Historical Materials Surrounding the Statute’s 
Enactment Reinforce the Notion that Domestic 
Corporations Should be Held Liable. 
An examination of the legislative history of the ATS underpins 
the Statute’s plain language, and suggests that domestic corporate 
 
3 “The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim 
the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such 
property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claims.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 506(c) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 
9
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persons are subject to liability. In its first session, the First 
Congress of the United States—with little instruction from the 
Constitution on the structure of the Judicial Branch—set out to 
write a federal statute developing the Judiciary’s framework. See 
JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., RL32118, THE ALIEN 
TORT STATUTE: LEGIS. HIST. AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS 4 
(2003). In 1789, Congress passed the Judiciary Act, which included 
the ATS. See id. The First Congress enacted the ATS as a 
jurisdictional statute, with the understanding that the district 
courts “would recognize private causes of action for certain torts in 
violation of the law of nations . . . .” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. When 
the ATS was drafted, the law of nations was generally comprised 
of two varieties: first, general norms governing behavior between 
nation-states, and second, where the “rules binding individuals for 
the benefit of other individuals overlapped with the norms of state 
relationships.” Id. at 714. 
Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government 
lacked the authority to prevent or remedy these violations of the 
law of nations, so Congress called upon the states to vindicate 
these rights and punish individuals for breaches of treaties and 
conventions to which the U.S. was a party. Id. at 716. In its 
Framer-era form, the ATS “enabled the United States to avoid 
responsibility for law of nations violations by permitting aliens to 
sue US citizens for intentional torts in federal court.” Anthony J. 
Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law 
of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 454 (2011) [hereinafter Bellia]. 
This commitment to enforce the law of nations on a domestic level 
was apparent and exemplified by the drafters of the ATS with its 
reference to torts. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714, 716. Without this statute 
in place, the United States would have been vulnerable to war 
initiated by the victim’s nation. Bellia, at 454. 
3. Domestic Corporate Immunity Under the ATS Leads to 
Absurd and Unjust Results. 
 
An essential canon of statutory interpretation is the principle 
of reduction ad absurdum (to avoid absurd results). See United 
States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 56 (1994) (opting to follow a 
“sensible construction” of a statute that avoids reaching an absurd 
outcome). Domestic corporate immunity under the ATS is simply 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/3
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incompatible with its purpose. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 
427 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should avoid construing 
the statute in a way that produces . . . absurd results.”). The 
Supreme Court has held that an “aggregate corporation, at 
common law, is a collection of individuals, united into one collective 
body, under a special name . . . possess[ing] the capacity . . . of 
suing and being sued.” Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 
U.S. 518, 667 (1819). The Court acknowledged that these entities 
exist and act in the same manner in every country. Id. at 668. The 
concept of a corporate entity is embedded in federal and state law, 
allowing a corporation to act as an individual exercising rights and 
responsibilities through the use of its natural members as its 
agents. It is a common understanding that a corporation is a 
juridical person with the capacity to be sued. See Cook Cty. v. 
United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 125–26 (2003). 
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co, the Second Circuit held 
that corporate liability was not recognized under the law of 
nations. 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010). The majority suggested 
that, by merely operating in corporate form, “commercial 
exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights can 
successfully shield those profits from victims’ claims for 
compensation . . . .” Id. at 150 (Leval, J., concurring). As Judge 
Leval indicated, “[t]he new rule [of corporate immunity] offers to 
unscrupulous businesses advantages of incorporation never before 
dreamed of.” Id. Such protection of corporations from civil liability 
has absurd results and grave consequences. Id. For example, upon 
incorporation, businesses will “be free to trade in or exploit 
slaves . . . perform genocides or operate torture prisons . . . or 
engage in piracy” without civil ramifications. Id. Under the 
majority’s wisdom, “such an enterprise could have hired itself out 
to operate Nazi extermination camps . . . immune from civil 
liability to its victims.” Id. The corporate shield validated by the 
majority in Kiobel is not only antithetical to fundamental human 
rights, but it also violates the ATS’s plain language and the history 
surrounding its enactment. 
Although the issue of corporate liability under the ATS was 
the question the Supreme Court granted for certiorari, the Court 
decided the Kiobel appeal on a wholly separate issue: 
extraterritoriality. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 
124 (2013). The uncertainty of corporate liability under the ATS 
11
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was left for future determination. As Justice Breyer made clear in 
his concurrence, there exists a “distinct interest in preventing the 
United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as 
criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of 
mankind.” Id. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring). It is not in our 
nation’s interest to allow corporations, like HexonGlobal, to cause 
harm, free of consequences. See id. at 135 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
B. The Supreme Court’s Recent Holding in Jesner v. 
Arab Bank Does Not Shield Domestic Corporations 
from Liability Pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute. 
In 2018, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether 
corporations could be sued under the Alien Tort Statute. Jesner v. 
Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018). The Court declined 
to answer the broad question of corporate liability, and narrowly 
held that foreign corporations were precluded from liability. Id. 
The decision to exclude foreign corporations from the reach of the 
ATS hinged on the Court’s incapacity to render the necessary 
policy judgments that are implicated under foreign corporate 
liability. Id. at 1403 (“The political branches, not the Judiciary, 
have the responsibility and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-
policy concerns.”). This analysis is not dispositive for domestic 
corporate liability. 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 
there was a four-to-one federal circuit courts split, with the 
majority endorsing a theory of corporate liability under the ATS. 
See Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(permitting a lawsuit against a U.S. corporate defendant for aiding 
and abetting child slavery); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 
F.3d 11, 54–57 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (declining to follow the Second 
Circuit’s judgment in Kiobel that the ATS precludes corporate 
liability), vacated on other grounds, 527 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 
2013); Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 
(7th Cir. 2011) (noting “corporate liability is possible under the 
[ATS]”); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (“The modern line of ATS cases initially involved state 
actors violating the law of nations, but subsequent cases have 
expanded the scope of the ATS to impose liability on . . . 
corporations.”); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/3
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(11th Cir. 2008) (considering the text of the ATS and noting that 
no provision expressly exempts corporations from liability under 
the statute). 
Since the Court’s decision in Jesner—which explicitly excluded 
foreign corporate liability but impliedly authorized domestic 
corporate liability—courts that have confronted the question of the 
latter have correctly interpreted the Supreme Court’s opinion to 
permit such liability. See Doe v. Nestle, USA, 906 F.3d 1120, 1124 
(9th Cir. 2018) (noting “Jesner did not eliminate all corporate 
liability under the ATS”); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 
320 F. Supp. 3d 781, 787 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2018) (“Jesner’s careful 
limiting of the analysis and holding suggests to this court that the 
Jesner Court did not intend to disturb this status quo with respect 
to domestic corporations.”). The decision in Jesner should not be 
applied expansively to foreclose domestic corporate liability under 
the Statute, since the Court’s holding was narrow, immunizing 
only foreign corporations. 
II. THE TRAIL SMELTER PRINCIPLE IS A CUSTOMARY 
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEABLE 
AS THE “LAW OF NATIONS” UNDER THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE. 
Under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), district courts have 
jurisdiction over tort actions brought by aliens alleging a violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350. What constitutes the “law of nations” has not been specified 
by statute, but has been exemplified through standards 
established by precedential cases and international sources. The 
principle derived from the Trail Smelter Arbitration is embedded 
as customary international law through international agreements, 
declarations, and practices of civilized nations. See infra Section 
II.B. The decision clearly expressed that, “a State owes at all times 
a duty to protect other States against injurious acts by individuals 
from within its jurisdiction.” Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. 
at 1963. The degree of specificity to which this Principle has been 
defined and the level of acceptance by the States of the world has 
established it as international law enforceable as the law of 
nations. 
A. Trail Smelter Relied on State Sovereignty and 
13
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Territorial Integrity in Defining the Rule Against 
Transboundary Harm. 
State sovereignty is understood as one of the most basic 
principles of international law. See U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 1 (The 
United Nations is “based on the principle of the sovereign equality 
of all its Members.”). This right extends to resource management 
within a State’s territory, as reflected in the principle of 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources declared by the 
United Nations (U.N.). G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 15 (Dec. 14, 1962). 
Sovereignty allows a State to exploit their own resources and 
choose “what the land and air within will have happen to them.” 
Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965. 
Coupled with the right to sovereignty and discretion to use 
one’s own resources is the concept of territorial integrity. 
Territorial integrity obliges States to respect the sovereignty, and 
therefore the encompassing territory, of other States while 
carrying on activities which exploit resources within their own 
boundaries. See Islands of Palmas Case, (Neth v. U.K.), 2 R.I.A.A. 
829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). While prevention of transboundary 
harm is the central obligation imposed in Trail Smelter, R. at 8, 
this principle has also been declared by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) as an obligation common in the international scheme. 
See The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 
4, 22 (Apr. 9) (stating every “State’s obligation not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of 
other States” as a general and well-recognized principle). In 
consideration of sovereignty, it is a reasonable demand that 
activities outside of a State’s control do not damage resources or 
property within the State’s territory. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 
R.I.A.A. at 1965. Accordingly, it is rational to require corporations 
and States, such as HexonGlobal and the U.S., to refrain from 
knowingly harming low-lying islands outside of their territory, 
such as A’na Atu. R. at 5–6. 
B. States Adopt the Trail Smelter Principle as a 
Universal Norm Governing the Rights and Duties 
to Each Other Based on Explicit and Accepted 
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Obligations. 
Customary international law is composed of those rules that 
States consistently abide by, or accede to, due to legal obligations 
and mutual concern. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 
248 (2nd Cir. 2003); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAWS OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). The 
Supreme Court requires any claim based on customary 
international law—or the present day “law of nations”—to be 
specific, universal, and obligatory so as to govern the behavior 
among States, including the duties corresponding to their rights as 
sovereign States. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714, 732. 
1. The Trail Smelter Principle Has Repeatedly Been 
Specified in Various Forms by the Most 
Distinguished Bodies of International Law. 
The Trail Smelter Tribunal was clear in its ruling: “under the 
principles of international law, as well as of the law of the United 
States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury . . . in or to the 
territory of another or the properties or persons therein . . . .” Trail 
Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965. The arbitral decision was 
not the first, nor the last place to explicitly recognize this principle, 
expressed as sic utere (use your own property in such a manner as 
not to injure that of another). See Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 
86, 89 (1890) (“Sic utere . . . is a maxim of universal application.”). 
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), it was reiterated that States have the 
sovereign right to “exploit their own resources” and a 
“responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States.” 
UNFCCC, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 166. As a ratified treaty, the 
UNFCCC’s legal status is equivalent to federal legislation. See 
infra Section IV. This rule against transboundary harm was also 
explicitly embodied in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration, U.N. General Assembly 
Resolutions, and by the behavior practiced among and across 
nations. See U.N. Conference on Env’t and Dev., Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), annex 1 (Aug. 12, 1992); U.N. 
15
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Conference on Env’t and Dev., Stockholm Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 
(June 1972); G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 15 (Dec. 14, 1962). The 
consistent, specific articulation of this principle is the resultant 
choice of the international community defining their interactions 
with each other. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (“[W]e now tend to 
understand common law not as a discoverable reflection of 
universal reason but, in a positivistic way, as a product of human 
choice.”). 
2. The Trail Smelter Principle is so Widely Practiced and 
Accepted by the Nations of the World That it is a 
Universal Norm. 
Although the Trail Smelter decision was only binding upon the 
United States and Canada, the underlying principle has been 
reiterated, validated, and adopted on a universal basis. In addition 
to the international bodies that specifically convey this principle, 
virtually all nations abide by and adopt it. Universal acceptance 
and usage allow practices to ripen into rules of international law. 
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1899). While there is great 
weight in finding the provision in multiple sources as proof of 
universality, there is also significant value in the number and 
influence of States who adopt the provision and act in accordance 
with its fundamental principles. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138. 
The greatest example of universality in the modern world of 
international relations is the United Nations. Membership is open 
to all States accepting the principles contained in the U.N. 
Charter, and by receiving the rights and benefits of membership, 
they agree to fulfill their assumed obligations in good faith. U.N. 
Charter art. 4 ¶ 1, art. 2 ¶ 2. Additionally, Members are to ensure 
non-member States act in accordance with these principles to 
maintain international peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 
6. Determining a rule is one of customary international law would 
mean the rule applies to nations who have not formally ratified it. 
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138. Of the 196 States in the world, 193 are 
U.N. Members, and the remaining three (Kosovo, the Vatican City, 
and Palestine) are non-member observers. Non-member States, 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-
states/non-member-states/index.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2018). 
The high level of membership is not only significant in showing 
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broad acceptance of the United Nations’ commitments and 
standards, but also lends support to universal adherence to the 
declarations of the international body. Members do not sit by idly—
they actively participate in the creation of agreements and 
resolutions that embody principles collectively practiced by the 
nations of the world. The United Nations has adopted the Principle 
upheld in Trail Smelter, see infra Section II.B.1, and the nations of 
the world have universally agreed to abide by this Principle, 
embracing it as an international norm to be followed by all. 
3. The Restriction on Transboundary Harm is Obligatory 
Because its Application Imposes the Rights 
Subsisting Between Nations and Operates as Law. 
The Supreme Court is of the opinion that declarations alone 
are simply statements of principles setting up a common “standard 
of achievement” for all nations, and would not qualify as a treaty 
or agreement imposing legal obligations. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734. 
When a customary international law is established, this norm 
“teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and the 
obligations corresponding to those rights,” and “prescribes the 
duties of nations, in their intercourse with each other.” Sosa, 542 
U.S. at 714 (second emphasis added) (first quoting E. DE VATTEL, 
LAW OF NATIONS 67 (1797); and then quoting 1 J. KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1). The obligation does not 
necessarily stem from the source of the principle, but rather 
derives from usage by civilized nations. This aligns with the 
Supreme Court’s historical approach—applying international law 
where there is no treaty or controlling act and enforcing it with the 
same authority as domestic laws. See The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. at 700 (affirming the administration of international law); 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (stating the laws of the United States 
recognize the law of nations and will apply international law when 
appropriate). 
III. THE TRAIL SMELTER PRINCIPLE, ACCEPTED AS 
THE LAW OF NATIONS, IMPOSES OBLIGATIONS 
ENFORCEABLE AGAINST NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ACTORS BECAUSE THEY ARE JURIDICAL PERSONS 
17
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SUBJECT TO LIABILITY. 
A. The Court Overlooks the Distinction Between 
Customary International Norms Enforceable as 
the Law of Nations and the Liability Imposed by 
Domestic Law. 
By following the Second Circuit in Kiobel, R. at 9, the District 
Court for New Union Island overlooked the key distinction between 
international norms of conduct and the actual remedies provided 
by federal courts. See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 50. Although it was 
acknowledged that “international law, of its own force, imposes no 
liabilities on corporations or other private juridical entities,” the 
Kiobel court also recognized that corporate liability for a violation 
of international law is an issue left to the individual nation who 
will be imposing civil liability. 621 F.3d at 121. The Jesner Court 
also followed Kiobel when deciding a foreign corporation would not 
be held liable under the ATS because corporate liability was not 
found to be an international norm so specific, universal, and 
obligatory to be considered the law of nations. 138 S. Ct. at 1401. 
While the courts in Jesner and Kiobel may not have held corporate 
liability to be a custom enforceable as the law of nations, the 
international norm being applied is not one of corporate liability. 
The international law violated is that expressed by the Trail 
Smelter Principle, but the violation is being brought before a U.S. 
federal court, not an international court of justice. The remedies 
available in federal courts arise under those laws that will be 
binding on the parties before the court—this includes international 
norms constituting the law of nations, but where no international 
law controls, federal laws must be applied. See The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. This reflects the presumption that 
United States law governs domestically, but does not rule the 
world. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115. 
When originally enforced, Trail Smelter imposed obligations 
against a non-governmental actor based on the fact that this 
corporation would be held liable by a decision of a U.S. court. Trail 
Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1966. The Trail Smelter 
Principle not only reflects the international norm that “no State 
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury. . . in or to the territory of another 
[State] or the properties or persons therein . . .” but also reflects 
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the same norm adopted by the United States. Id. at 1965; see 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907) (“[I]t is 
a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the 
air over its territory should not be polluted . . . and whatever 
domestic destruction they may have suffered, should not be further 
destroyed or threatened by the act of persons beyond its 
control . . . .”). While Canada was party to the arbitration, the 
obligations and alterations were enforced against the company 
responsible for the damage. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. 
at 1966. HexonGlobal is the domestic corporation bearing 
responsibility for nearly a third of all U.S. GHG emissions, which 
have largely contributed to Mana’s climate change induced 
damages. R. at 5. 
B. International Law Recognizes the Individual 
Liability of Non-Governmental Actors. 
Although the remedy lies in the hands of federal courts, rather 
than international norms, it is nevertheless true that international 
law does not provide for corporate immunity, and has held non-
governmental actors responsible for violations of the law of 
nations. The Nuremberg Tribunals are oft-cited as an 
authoritative source of customary international law. See G.A. Res. 
95 (I) (Dec. 11, 1946). The Tribunal specifically recognized 
individual liability while stating “international law imposes duties 
and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon states” and 
“individuals can be punished for violations of international law.” 
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126 (quoting The Nurnberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D. 
69, 110 (Int’l Mil. Trib. at Nuremberg 1946)). 
While the Tribunal itself is authoritative on international law, 
the principles it enforces stem from developed national laws, 
considering that international law comes into existence by 
widespread application and acceptance of such laws. See BIN 
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 24 (2006). International 
law draws from domestic laws because they are generally more 
developed and “for the good reason that a principle which is found 
to be generally accepted by civilized legal systems may fairly be 
assumed to be so reasonable” as to be applicable to all just legal 
systems. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 62–63 (6th ed. 1963). 
General principles of international law—derived from domestic 
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laws and applied to non-governmental actors—lend support to the 
principle practiced by the United States, see Section I.A.2., and 
other nations, that corporations can be held liable for their actions. 
Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 54. It is recognized in legal systems 
throughout the world that corporate responsibility is part of the 
privilege of legal personhood. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco 
Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 629 n.20 (1983). 
IV. THE TRAIL SMELTER PRINCIPLE IS NOT 
DISPLACED BY THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAUSE IT DOES 
NOT CONFLICT WITH THE ACT AND THE PRINCIPLE IS 
EMBODIED IN A SUBSEQUENTLY ENACTED U.S. 
TREATY. 
A. In the United States, Ratified Treaties are the 
Supreme Law of the Land. 
The Supremacy Clause4
 
ranks the Constitution as the 
supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI. Federal law and 
formalized treaties are equally elevated to this status, so long as 
they are not in conflict with—or “displaced” by—the Constitution. 
Id.; see Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“By the 
Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of 
like obligation, with an act of legislation.”); see also Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006). The power to enter 
into treaties is conferred in Article II of the Constitution. U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In the U.S., a treaty enters into full force 
of law, “when the President, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, has ratified it or otherwise given official notification of 
consent to be bound, provided the agreement is also in force 
internationally.” RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE U.S., Td No. 2 § 104 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
B. When a Ratified Treaty and Federal Law are Not in 
Conflict, They Ought to be Construed so as to 
 
4 “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  
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Effectuate Both. 
It is well established that federal law and treaties have the 
effect of preempting conflicting state law. When a federal law and 
a ratified treaty broach the same subject but can coexist, since both 
are declared by the Constitution as supreme law, “the courts will 
always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if 
that can be done without violating the language of either.” 
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194. 
1. The Trail Smelter Principle Has Been Incorporated 
into a Treaty Ratified by the United States. 
The Trail Smelter Principle, discussed at length in Section II, 
has been embodied by numerous international agreements and 
treaties ratified by the U.S. For example, the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) was adopted in 1979, 
signed and ratified by the U.S. in 1981, and went into force in 1983. 
LRTAP, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mt
dsg_no=XXVII- 1&chapter=27&clang=_en. The agreement aims to 
limit and “gradually reduce and prevent air pollution including 
long-range transboundary air pollution.” LRTAP, Nov. 13, 1979, 
1302 U.N.T.S. 217, 220. The Trail Smelter Principle is 
incorporated in LRTAP’s Preamble.5
 
Id. at 219. As a ratified, self-
executing treaty, LRTAP remains the supreme law of the land, 
unless in conflict with constitutional provisions, or followed by 
inconsistent federal legislation. 
Roughly a decade after LRTAP went into effect, the U.S. 
reaffirmed its recognition of the Trail Smelter Principle as 
domestic law. See R. at 6. In 1992, then-President George H.W. 
Bush, upon advice and consent of the Senate, ratified the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Id. The UNFCCC recognized the impact of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions on destabilizing the climate system and entrusted 
 
5 “States have, in accordance with . . . the principles of international law, the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction . . . .”  
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developed nations with adopting mitigation policies commensurate 
with their GHG emissions. See UNFCCC, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 169. 
Just as the LRTAP, the UNFCCC’s Preamble6
 
articulates the Trail 
Smelter Principle and its prohibition of transboundary harm. Id. 
at 166. The UNFCCC remains a ratified treaty in the United 
States. Thus, it is entitled to constitutional supremacy. U.S. 
CONST. art. VI. 
2. Treaties Embodying the Trail Smelter Principle Do Not 
Conflict with the Clean Air Act’s Regulation of 
Greenhouse Gases. 
The Trail Smelter Principle is not at odds with section 
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2018), and 
both should operate with the full force of law. The Principle, as 
articulated in the arbitration between the U.S. and Canada, 
focuses on territorial infringement by one State of another State 
through environmental pollution. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 
R.I.A.A. at 1966. The notion that one may not conduct itself in such 
a way that imposes harm across national boundaries can coexist 
with the CAA’s regulation of greenhouse gases. In fact, courts 
should seek to enforce both the federal law and the treaty when 
possible. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194. 
C. Even If the Trail Smelter Principle Conflicts with 
the Clean Air Act, the UNFCCC Displaces the 
Federal Legislation Because It Went into Effect 
Most Recently. 
When federal law and a ratified treaty are inconsistent “the 
one last in date will control the other . . . .” Whitney, 124 U.S. at 
194; see Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998); see also 
Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1263, 1265 (2002) (“When properly approved and 
ratified, [a treaty’s] substantive provisions can both preempt 
conflicting state law and even displace earlier federal statutes.”) 
 
6 “States have, in accordance with . . . the principles of international law, the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction . . . .” 
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(emphasis added). Even if the Preambles of the LRTAP and 
UNFCCC, which contain the Trail Smelter Principle, conflict with 
the Clean Air Act’s regulation of greenhouse gases, the UNFCCC 
went into full force subsequent to the enactment of the CAA and 
its most recent amendments. Thus, the treaty displaces the federal 
statute. See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194. 
In 1958, scientists began regularly recording measurements of 
CO2 in the atmosphere at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii. 
Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/full.html (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2018). The first recording indicated a mean of 315.97 parts 
per million. Id. Shortly thereafter, the Clean Air Act of 1963 was 
enacted as the first federal legislation to authorize “the 
development of a national program to address air pollution related 
environmental problems.” Evolution of the Clean Air Act, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-
act (last visited Sept. 1, 2018) [hereinafter Evolution of the CAA]. 
Since its enactment, three major amendments to the CAA 
have occurred. Id. In 1970, the EPA’s authority to regulate air 
pollution expanded with the development of several programs 
authorizing the regulation of emissions. Id. “[B]y the time 
Congress drafted § 202(a)(1) in 1970, [CO2] levels had reached 325 
parts per million.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007). 
Most recently, in 1990, the EPA’s authority expanded once again—
this time to include stationary source permitting. See Evolution of 
the CAA. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court recognized 
the agency’s authority to regulate GHG emissions pursuant to 
section 202(a)(1) of the Act. 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007). Since the 
Court’s decision, the EPA issued new findings and implemented 
various regulations pertaining to GHG emissions. See, e.g., 
Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009); Light-
Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 
7, 2010). However, these actions by the EPA are enabled through 
the 1990 version of the Clean Air Act. Any conflict between 
regulations passed pursuant to the 1990 federal legislation and a 
U.S. treaty ratified after that time will be supplanted by the treaty. 
Therefore, because the UNFCCC was ratified in 1992 and remains 
in effect to this day, it displaces any substantive portions of the 
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CAA that conflict. See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194. HexonGlobal’s 
failure to comply to the UNFCCC obligations was an act committed 
in violation of a binding and enforceable U.S. treaty. 
V. THE UNITED STATES VIOLATED ITS PUBLIC TRUST 
OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THE GLOBAL CLIMATE 
ECOSYSTEM, THEREBY DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF FLOOD 
OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
The Public Trust Doctrine, which long predates this nation’s 
founding, is the notion that “every sovereign government holds 
vital natural resources in ‘trust’ for the public—present and future 
generations of citizen beneficiaries.” Mary Christina Wood, 
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the 
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): 
Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. 
L. 43 (2009) [hereinafter Wood]. As early as sixth century Rome’s 
Institutes of Justinian, the doctrine of res communis was 
understood to include “air, running water, the sea, and 
consequently the seashore.” THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 35 (J.B. 
Moyle ed., trans., 4th ed. 1906). The roots of the doctrine 
permeated English common law, and in 1882, the doctrine was first 
articulated in a U.S. court decision. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 
71 (1821). The New Jersey Supreme Court identified “air” among 
the natural resources entitled to all. Id. The increasing 
temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, and rising sea levels are, 
by natural law, aspects of the global climate system entitled to all. 
R. at 4. 
A. Under the Public Trust Doctrine, The United States 
Serves as Fiduciary to the Trust and, Thus, Must 
Protect Property Held Therein. 
The Public Trust Doctrine, like a private trust, includes three 
primary elements: 
(1) a trustee, who holds the trust property and is subject to 
equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of another; (2) a 
beneficiary, to whom the trustee owes equitable duties to deal with 
the trust property for his benefit; [and] (3) trust property, which is 
held by the trustee for the beneficiary. 
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 
1959). As applied to natural resources, the doctrine obligates a 
trustee to uphold its fiduciary duty “to protect the trust property 
against damage or destruction.” GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., 
BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 582 (2016). In essence, the 
doctrine demands of the trustee environmental stewardship to 
sustain benefits of the trust intergenerationally. 
A trustee’s duty of protection requires action. DOUGLAS 
QUIRKE, ENVTL. AND NAT. RES. LAW CTR., THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE: A PRIMER 13 (2016) [hereinafter QUIRKE]. As the 
Supreme Court noted in Geer v. Connecticut, “it is the duty of the 
legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of 
the trust . . . .” 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896), overruled on other 
grounds, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Thus, 
taking a passive role or failing to act when necessary constitutes a 
breach of fiduciary duty. QUIRKE, at 13. Importantly, a trustee 
owes a duty “to restore the trust if it is damaged due to a breach . . . 
or third-party damage.” Id. at 15 (emphasis added). A procedural 
component of this obligation is that a trustee furnishes adequate 
information and knowledge to perform duties competently. Id. at 
13. The trustee’s obligations are unalterable and enduring, “and 
can only be destroyed by the destruction of the sovereign.” United 
States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981). 
B. The United States Breached its Fiduciary Duty to 
the Public Trust When It Failed to Adequately 
Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Supported the Fossil Fuel Industry through 
Federal Policies and Subsidies. 
A solemn report released by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), a body of the United Nations which is 
comprised of the globe’s leading climate scientists, indicates the 
world and its inhabitants have limited time to act in order to halt 
the dire impacts of climate change. IPCC Synthesis Report, at 8. 
Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further 
warming and long- lasting changes in all components of the 
climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and 
irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems. Limiting climate 
change would require substantial and sustained reductions in 
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greenhouse gas emissions which, together with adaptation, can 
limit climate change risks. 
Id. The numerous reports released by the IPCC since its founding 
in 1988 make evident that sweeping and concerted action must 
occur if climate catastrophe is to be avoided. Id. It is clear that a 
“tipping point” is in sight, one in which anthropogenic climate 
change will set the planet on a path of no return. See Wood, at 50. 
Climate change science has been widely accessible for decades, and 
the United States government—as trustee to the public trust 
within its sovereign state—cannot claim guiltlessness on the basis 
of ignorance. See R. at 6. 
Despite the overwhelming evidence of the correlation between 
GHG emissions and climate change, the U.S. government remains 
instrumental in fossil fuel dependency. R. at 6. Federal legislation 
has enabled agencies to regulate the depletion and destruction of 
numerous natural resources through permitting programs. 
QUIRKE, at 16–17. For example, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) permits water pollution through the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) and air 
pollution through the New Source Review (NSR). See, e.g., 40 
C.F.R. § 122 (2014); 40 C.F.R. § 51.307 (2014). These permitting 
programs, however, do not sufficiently prevent impairment of 
natural resources held in the public trust. “When granting a 
permit, federal law essentially shields damaging activities from 
liability, regardless of how devastating the consequences to trust 
resources.” QUIRKE, at 16–17. Such actions are antithetical to the 
longevity of natural resources and the trust’s future beneficiaries. 
Aside from regulatory permitting, the federal government has 
supported and continues to support the exploration, extraction, 
and combustion of fossil fuels through subsidies. See Mona Hymel, 
The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives: 
The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 47 (2006) [hereinafter Hymel, Tax Incentives]. 
For more than a century, the U.S. “has added and expanded tax 
incentives for fossil fuel energy.” Mona L. Hymel, Environmental 
Tax Policy and the United States: A “Bit” of History, 3 ARIZ. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157, 159 (2013). The U.S. is inextricably linked 
to the oil, gas, and coal industries, providing in excess of $370 
billion in tax breaks over the past century. Hymel, Tax Incentives, 
at 71. Each year, the U.S. government provides an estimated $14.7 
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billion in federal subsidies. REDMAN ET AL., OIL CHANGE INT’L, 
DIRTY ENERGY DOMINANCE: DEPENDENT ON DENIAL: HOW THE 
U.S. FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY DEPENDS ON SUBSIDIES AND CLIMATE 
DENIAL 5 (Oct. 2017) [hereinafter REDMAN]. Under the Trump 
Administration alone, royalty rates have decreased for drilling in 
offshore waters, the Department of the Interior (DOI) discontinued 
ongoing review of royalty rates for coal extracted from public lands, 
and the DOI increased the budget by $10 million for the Outer 
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, encouraging 
offshore oil and gas drilling. REDMAN, at 14. The federal 
government’s persistent support of third- party fossil fuel 
companies, R. at 6, despite the recognized impact of fossil fuel 
dependency, renders the U.S. complicit in natural resource 
degradation, in violation of their role as trustee. 
C. The United States Violated Appellant Flood’s Due 
Process Rights When It Breached its Fiduciary 
Duty as Trustee to the Public Trust, Which 
Contributed to Destabilizing the Climate System. 
The U.S. government is proscribed from depriving persons “of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. The federal government, in violation of its 
fiduciary duties to the public trust, has actively contributed to 
GHG emissions reaching dangerous levels through pollution 
permitting and fossil fuel subsidies. See infra Section V.B. 
Consequently, U.S. actions were integral in destabilizing the 
climate system. R. at 6. In Juliana v. United States, a case on point, 
Judge Aiken correctly concluded, “the right to a climate system 
capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and 
ordered society.” 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016). Without 
a stable climate system, civilization would be nonexistent. Id. 
The changing climate has already impacted Flood. R. at 5. He 
has incurred financial loss associated with seawater damage to his 
home—damage that would not have occurred but for the GHG-
induced sea level rise. R. at 5. Flood is at increased risk of heat 
stroke and mosquito-borne diseases because of higher 
temperatures. R. at 5. Ocean acidification, global warming, and 
loss of coastal wetlands will soon reduce Flood’s access to local 
seafood, which he heavily relies on. R. at 5. The parties do not 
dispute that limits on fossil fuel production and combustion would 
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reduce further property damage, lessen the health risks associated 
with increased temperatures, and maintain the habitability of 
Flood’s community. R. at 5. Since a stable climate is a necessary 
condition to existing fundamental rights, including life, liberty, 
and property, the federal government’s role in anthropogenic GHG 
emissions violates Flood’s due process rights. 
 
VI. APPELLANTS’ ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND PUBLIC 
TRUST CLAIMS DO NOT PRESENT POLITICAL 
QUESTIONS AND ARE PROPER FOR ADJUDICATION 
CONSIDERING THE ABSENCE OF ALL OF THE BAKER 
FACTORS. 
 
Federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate a case or 
controversy capable of resolution through the judicial process. 
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516. Courts are unable to revise 
implemented policies or entertain issues otherwise entrusted to 
Congress or the Executive Branch. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 
277 (2004). This restriction against deciding “political questions” 
does not prevent federal courts from creating resolutions which 
will remedy violations of rights or interpret statutes to enforce 
previously authorized actions. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1270; 
see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 530–35 (explaining the EPA’s 
duties cannot be ignored because the consequences touch on 
obligations of other agencies, nor does the subject preclude the 
Court from enforcing obligations). A nonjusticiable political 
question would be present if any of the factors identified in Baker 
v. Carr7
 
were reflected in the dispute. 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
Neither claim presently before the court demonstrate these factors, 
therefore both are proper for judicial resolution. 
 
7 Factors include: “[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or 
[5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”  
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A. Resolution of the Alien Tort Statute Claim and 
Public Trust Claim Have Been Designated to the 
Judiciary through Constitutional Commitment, 
Express Statutory Language, and a Lack of 
Assignment to Other Political Branches. 
The political question doctrine prevents federal courts from 
deciding cases where there is a “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. The duty to resolve the Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS) and public trust claims have been designated 
to the Judicial Branch—rather than the Executive or Legislative 
Branch—by various sources. The Constitution expressly gives 
judicial power to all cases arising under the Constitution and laws 
of the United States, including controversies to which the United 
States shall be a party, such as the public trust claim, and where 
the dispute involves citizens of foreign States, such as the ATS 
claim. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Furthermore, the public trust 
claim arises under the Constitution by its origination in the Due 
Process Clause, imposed to prevent the government from abusing 
its power. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; see Deshaney v. Winnebago 
County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). The duty 
to interpret such cases is committed by the Constitution to the 
Judicial Branch alone. 
Express statutory language and established case law have also 
provided the Judiciary with control over such matters. The 
language of the ATS specifically provides jurisdiction over civil 
actions brought by aliens. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). While foreign 
policy power is delegated to the President, it would be erroneous to 
assume any case touching foreign relations lies beyond judicial 
cognizance. Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 663 F. 
Supp. 2d 863, 873 (N.D. Ca. 2009). Presupposing such is outside of 
the Judiciary’s power would defeat the purpose of statutes like the 
ATS or others similarly rooted in areas generally designated to the 
Executive or Legislative branches, and would turn any challenge 
into a political question. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 
(1983). Additionally, the Judicial Branch has resolved issues 
regarding property held in public trust since the United States 
came into existence. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 
(1823) (clarifying that the United States’ exclusive ownership of all 
lands within it was established by discovery and conquest). 
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Resolving public trust questions is a familiar practice for the 
courts. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 
(1988). 
Further evidence of the judicial power to resolve this issue is 
presented by a lack of constitutional commitment of the issue to 
any other branch. The political question doctrine prevents the 
courts from intruding on policy choices and judgments of Congress 
or the President. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th 
Cir. 1992). Here, there is no express provision of the Constitution 
granting power over these matters—a tort claim brought against a 
domestic corporation by an alien and a public trust claim brought 
against the United States by its own citizen—to either of the other 
branches. On the contrary, the final determination of such 
controversies rests solely with the Judiciary, as expressed by the 
Constitution, the statutes constructed by Congress, and precedent 
case law surrounding the claims. 
B. Analysis of Both Claims are Within the Judiciary’s 
Legal Expertise and Ability to Discover 
Manageable Standards Necessary for Resolution 
Rather than Requiring the Court to Determine 
New Policies. 
The second and third factors presented in Baker8 ask whether 
resolution of the question would demand the court to go beyond the 
scope of its judicial expertise, in both the ability to declare 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and under the 
condition that claims be resolved without an initial policy 
determination. Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 874. 
Both claims brought by plaintiffs are capable of resolution without 
surpassing judicial limits. Plaintiffs seek a determination of 
whether a law has been violated and whether the United States 
holds property in public trust—these require interpretation of the 
law and the Constitution, and are determinations for which there 
are clearly judicially manageable standards. See Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969). 
 
8 “[2] lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion...”  
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1. Judicial Resolution Does Not Require Scientific 
Certainty and the Court Only Needs to Administer 
Broad Obligations to the Extent Necessary for Action. 
The question is not whether the case is unmanageable in 
terms of its complexity or consequences, but whether courts have 
the “legal tools to reach a ruling that is principled, rational, and 
based upon reason distinctions.” Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. 
Supp. 2d at 874. The District Court for New Union Island, in 
following Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
incorrectly interpreted what manageable standards entail. 663 F. 
Supp. 2d at 874–75. While the court must necessarily balance the 
competing interests of the parties, this does not require resolution 
of the dispute with the high level of scientific certainty requested 
in Kivalina. See id. Manageable standards have been developed in 
similar situations, such as in Massachusetts v. EPA, where the 
Court simply directed the EPA to look at the available scientific 
evidence and adopt standards which would prevent the alleged 
violations from causing further harm. 549 U.S. at 519– 20. While 
the court should respect an agency’s broad discretion in carrying 
out delegated responsibilities, the obligation to carry out those 
responsibilities will be enforced where the refusal to act causes 
harm. Id. at 534 (“Nor can EPA avoid its statutory obligation by 
noting the uncertainty surrounding various features of climate 
change and concluding that it would therefore be better not to 
regulate at this time.”). Although the court may be uninterested in 
oppressing one party to advance the interests of the other, this is 
not necessary. It is possible to analyze and adjust competing 
interests in order to allow continuation and prevent damage. See 
Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1939. 
2. Courts are Capable of Resolving Claims Without 
Creating New Policies, Particularly When the 
Constitution and Statutes Clearly Provide for 
Judicial Enforcement. 
Federal courts have proven they are capable of crafting 
creative results without an initial policy determination. While 
courts are unable to adopt a new or better policy, they are able to 
enforce policy and address constitutional violations. See 
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533–35; Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 
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1270. By resolving both the ATS and public trust claims, the court 
would not be creating new policies, but simply enforcing those 
already established. The ATS provides for resolution of violations 
of the law of nations as defined in Section II above. The purpose of 
the Statute is to provide a platform for enforcement of 
international law violations. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714. It is also the 
court’s duty to address constitutional violations as they arise. By 
resolving the public trust claim, the court is not creating a new 
doctrine, but rather protecting the people from obstruction or 
interference with property held in public trust, as protected by the 
Due Process Clause. See Ill. Cent. R. Co v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 
452 (1892). 
C. Prudential Considerations of Prior Political 
Declarations Cannot Prevent the Court from 
Fulfilling its Designated Obligation to Settle 
Disputes. 
The remaining Baker factors9
 
prevent the court from ruling on 
political questions where resolution would violate the separation 
of powers. Such prudential concerns call for mutual respect among 
the three branches. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000 (1979). 
While at first sight these claims seem to invoke the authority of 
the other branches, courts have the authority to construe 
legislation, executive agreements, treaties, and international laws. 
Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 
(1986) (“it goes without saying that interpreting congressional 
legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts”). 
Questions may arise in areas where the court would gladly avoid 
them, but the court cannot avoid such questions where it is their 
duty to address them. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). 
The claims presently before the court are purely legal 
questions. While there is an interplay between foreign relations 
and domestic regulations, it is the Judiciary’s role to interpret 
statutes and the Constitution, and this responsibility cannot be 
 
9 “[4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or 
[5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”  
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avoided merely because the decisions may have political overtones. 
Id.; Powell, 395 U.S. at 548–49. This responsibility does not show 
a lack of respect due a coordinate branch of government, but rather 
emphasizes the role of the Judicial Branch. Congress or the 
President cannot determine the applicability of an unclear statute 
or interpret the Constitution—this decision is left to the courts. 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012). Our federal system 
may require courts to interpret the Constitution and statutes in a 
“manner at variance with the construction given the document by 
another branch.” Powell, 395 U.S. at 549. But, resolution of these 
claims will not result in “multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question,” for it is the responsibility of the 
courts to act as the ultimate interpreter of such claims arising 
under the Constitution. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. Additionally, these 
claims are presently before the court because there have not been 
declarations by any other branch which provide enough specificity 
to resolve the issues. 
Resolution of these questions may not be easy, but they only 
require the court to apply normal principles of interpretation to the 
provisions at issue. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 548–49. Because the 
claims do not raise questions entrusted to one of the other political 
branches, nor has a political decision already been made which the 
court should adhere to or which would result in multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question, the 
court must fulfill its duty to resolve discrepancies in the law. 
Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir. 2005). It has 
long been the responsibility of the Judiciary to resolve difficult 
issues of interpretation. Whether such disputes touch on areas of 
international law or otherwise impact foreign policy, or in those 
decisions which will uphold the constitutional protections afforded 
to the people of the United States, so long as prudential concerns 
do not disrupt the balance of power between the coordinate 
branches of government, the Judicial Branch must carry out its 
duty to hold individuals, entities, and the government responsible 
for violations of the law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Upon the foregoing, Appellants, Organization of Disappearing 
Island Nations, Apa Mana, and Noah Flood, respectfully request 
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that this appellate court reverse the district court’s decision and 
remand for further proceedings. 
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